Among physical events, it is impossible that an event could alter its own past for the simple reason that past events precede future events, and not vice versa. Moreover, to do so would invoke impossible self-causation. However, mental events are constructed by physical neuronal processes that take a finite duration to execute. Given this fact, it is conceivable that later brain events could alter the ongoing interpretation of previous brain events if they arrive within this finite duration of interpretive processing, before a commitment is made to what happened. In the current study, we show that humans can volitionally influence how they perceive an ambiguous apparent motion sequence, as long as the top-down command occurs up to 300 ms after the occurrence of the actual motion event in the world. This finding supports the view that there is a temporal integration period over which perception is constructed on the basis of both bottom-up and top-down inputs.
Introduction
Among physical events, the future comprises the set of possible states open to a system, whereas the past comprises events that have already happened and which are no longer possible. A system cannot alter its past. If it could, this would have to be a possibility open to the system, which would then paradoxically place the past in the future of the system. Moreover, changing one's own past would be tantamount to self-causation, which is logically flawed because circular.
In contrast, mental events, such as those underlying visual perception, are constructed on the basis of inputs that are sensorily detected over a finite duration. For example, in order to see apparent motion (Kolers & von Grünau, 1976; Ramachandran & Anstis, 1986) , there must be a comparison between an object at one location at time 1 and another object at a different location at a later time 2 such that they get bound together over space and time as a single object that moves from position 1 at time 1 to position 2 at time 2. Information about the position of the stimulus at time 1 must have been held online during the duration before stimulus 2 at time 2 appears. Apparent motion thus implies the existence of a perceptual buffer that spans a finite duration of inputs. Stimuli are compared over this finite duration before a commitment is made concerning what happened to give rise to those inputs. The perceived apparent motion path is then, in a sense, a postdictively constructed cover story about what most likely happened to give rise to the sequence of sensory inputs, given the evidence gathered over some finite duration. This perceptual buffer permits the influence of stages of form analysis (Tse, 2006; Tse & Caplovitz, 2006) and expectations (Tse & Cavanagh, 2000) on the construction of motion paths.
Whatever the duration of this perceptual buffer is, it cannot be very long: if it took twenty minutes to construct the perceived motion path of a tennis ball, we would never be able to hit it. On the other hand, in the absence of any duration over which inputs are integrated, no motion sequences could be constructed at all. Evolution presumably created perceptual systems that occupy a "sweet spot" where an adequate processing duration affords the possibility of inferring accurate motion paths constructed on the basis of discretely sampled, noisy and often ambiguous inputs, without taking so long as to make it impossible to respond to rapid events in the world.
Tse and Logothetis (2002) inferred that this buffer lasted at least ∼120 ms, given data that form could influence the perception of transformational apparent motion over this duration. Other studies have also suggested that there is a time window during which subsequent inputs can influence the perception of prior inputs. Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000, 2007) demonstrated that the perceived position of a visual stimulus could be influenced by motion signals that occur up to ∼80 ms following its appearance. Choi and Scholl (2006) found that the perception of causality could be influenced by contextual motion presented as late as 200 ms after the event. Sergent et al. (2013) reported that an exogenous attention cue presented 400 ms after the presentation could increase the subjective visibility of the stimulus. Kahneman, Treisman, and Gibbs (1992) found that the object-specific
